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69 lines
3.0 KiB
Plaintext
===========================
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Django 1.10.3 release notes
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===========================
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*November 1, 2016*
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Django 1.10.3 fixes two security issues and several bugs in 1.10.2.
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User with hardcoded password created when running tests on Oracle
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=================================================================
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When running tests with an Oracle database, Django creates a temporary database
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user. In older versions, if a password isn't manually specified in the database
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settings ``TEST`` dictionary, a hardcoded password is used. This could allow
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an attacker with network access to the database server to connect.
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This user is usually dropped after the test suite completes, but not when using
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the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
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(such as an attacker's connection).
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A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
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DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
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===============================================
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Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
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``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
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vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
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<https://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`__.
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While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
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at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
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developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
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some production services for which there's no development instance, for
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example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
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the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
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developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
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``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
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convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
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variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
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your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
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now omit it to get those fallback values.
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Bugfixes
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========
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* Allowed ``User.is_authenticated`` and ``User.is_anonymous`` properties to be
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tested for ``set`` membership (:ticket:`27309`).
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* Fixed a performance regression when running ``migrate`` in projects
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with ``RenameModel`` operations (:ticket:`27279`).
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* Added ``model_name`` to the ``allow_migrate()`` calls in ``makemigrations``
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(:ticket:`27200`).
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* Made the ``JavaScriptCatalog`` view respect the ``packages`` argument;
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previously it was ignored (:ticket:`27374`).
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* Fixed ``QuerySet.bulk_create()`` on PostgreSQL when the number of objects is
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a multiple plus one of ``batch_size`` (:ticket:`27385`).
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* Prevented ``i18n_patterns()`` from using too much of the URL as the language
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to fix a use case for ``prefix_default_language=False`` (:ticket:`27063`).
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* Replaced a possibly incorrect redirect from ``SessionMiddleware`` when a
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session is destroyed in a concurrent request with a ``SuspiciousOperation``
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to indicate that the request can't be completed (:ticket:`27363`).
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