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61 lines
2.5 KiB
Plaintext
==========================
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Django 1.4.2 release notes
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==========================
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*October 17, 2012*
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This is the second security release in the Django 1.4 series.
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Host header poisoning
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=====================
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Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
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use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
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header. Some attacks against this are beyond Django's ability to control, and
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require the web server to be properly configured; Django's documentation has
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for some time contained notes advising users on such configuration.
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Django's own built-in parsing of the Host header is, however, still vulnerable,
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as was reported to us recently. The Host header parsing in Django 1.3.3 and
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Django 1.4.1 -- specifically, ``django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`` -- was
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incorrectly handling username/password information in the header. Thus, for
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example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when running on
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``validsite.com``:
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.. code-block:: text
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Host: validsite.com:random@evilsite.com
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Using this, an attacker can cause parts of Django -- particularly the
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password-reset mechanism -- to generate and display arbitrary URLs to users.
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To remedy this, the parsing in ``HttpRequest.get_host()`` is being modified;
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Host headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as
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username/password pairs) now raise the exception
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:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
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Details of this issue were initially posted online as a `security advisory`_.
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.. _security advisory: https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/oct/17/security/
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Backwards incompatible changes
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==============================
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* The newly introduced :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
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constructor arguments have been adapted to match those of all other model
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fields. The first two keyword arguments are now verbose_name and name.
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Other bugfixes and changes
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==========================
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* Subclass HTMLParser only for appropriate Python versions (#18239).
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* Added batch_size argument to qs.bulk_create() (#17788).
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* Fixed a small regression in the admin filters where wrongly formatted dates
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passed as url parameters caused an unhandled ValidationError (#18530).
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* Fixed an endless loop bug when accessing permissions in templates (#18979)
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* Fixed some Python 2.5 compatibility issues
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* Fixed an issue with quoted filenames in Content-Disposition header (#19006)
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* Made the context option in ``trans`` and ``blocktrans`` tags accept literals
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wrapped in single quotes (#18881).
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* Numerous documentation improvements and fixes.
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